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The liberal tradition, in its broadest sense, has had a prominent role in 
shaping Western society as we know it today. Most notably, liberalism has 
been a central force in the liberation of countries and their citizens from 
aristocratic feudalism as well as political and religious paternalism. Fur-
thermore, liberalism, especially through its moral foundations, has shaped 
our perspective on individuals as free, autonomous, and equal beings. The 
first liberals were those in search of a new order after the chaotic times 
of early industrial capitalism and three late 18th century political revolu-
tions—the American, Dutch, and French—that had turned society and 
politics upside down. Central to these developments were principles of 
freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought and speech, the 
division of governmental powers, and rights of private property and eco-
nomic freedom (Starr, 2007). The leading figures in the development of 
these principles were, among others, John Locke, Charles de Montesquieu, 
Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill. Based on the thoughts, prin-
ciples, and moral convictions of these leading figures, notions like the rule 
of law and the free market developed, resulting in a metamorphosis of 
Western society from a deeply religious, feudal, and unequal society, to 
one with a secular, liberal democracy in which personal rights and liberties 
are upheld and protected by the state and its institutions. 
These rights and liberties that protect individuals from unsolicited 
interference with their private lives and property created a stable basis for 
economic progress. This is not to claim, however, that liberal thought has 
been completely consistent and unambiguous throughout different regions 
or time periods. Despite the lack of unanimity among liberals, Fawcett 
(2014) identifies four broad ideas that served as a foundation for liberalism 
and reoccurred throughout the history of liberal thought: the acknowledge-
ment of inescapable ethical and material conflict within society, distrust of 
power, faith in human progress, and unconditional respect for individuals. 
Thus, even though there is no canonical version of liberalism itself, these 
four ideas indicate that liberalism in general can be regarded as the search 
for an “ethically acceptable order of human progress among civic equals 
without recourse to undue power” (ibid., p. xv). Rooted in moral convic-
tions of equality and freedom, the purpose of liberalism, therefore, is to 
create the conditions for a society in which each citizen can realise his or 
her aims without unsolicited interference, and fully develop his or her 
capacities to the benefit of society. 
Throughout recent history, however, critical thinkers like Wendy 
Brown have come to address the discontents that are paired with the 20th 
century resurgence of liberalism: neoliberalism. Brown argues that neo-
liberalism is profoundly destructive to the ideas that lie at the basis of our 
liberal democracy, since it is a deeply disseminated governing rationality 
that puts the economy at the centre of society, of its institutions, and of 
human understanding and action. More specifically, with the dawn of neo-
liberalism came the extension of market values such as competition into 
all areas of life, including the economy, politics, and society. As Foucault 
described in his lectures at Collège de France, through neoliberal govern-
mentality these market values became an integral aspect of understanding, 
action, and even being. This governmentality is a mentality in which peo-
ple are governed and govern themselves by means of educating desires and 
configuring habits, aspirations, and beliefs with ‘investment’ and ‘com-
petition’ as its operative terms. In other words, what is taking place is 
an economisation of heretofore noneconomic spheres and activities. Con-
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sequently, neoliberal governmentality has put forth a new anthropology, 
one that takes the individual as a homo economicus: a purely rational, 
calculating, and self-interested agent. Therefore, through this hegemonic 
neoliberal discourse, the wide liberal tradition, despite its rich history in 
which it was ultimately concerned with notions of good and evil, becomes 
generally focused on the endorsement of market values, overshadowing 
the robust moral convictions that shaped the liberal tradition.
These moral convictions of the liberal tradition have been an essential 
aspect of the aforementioned metamorphosis of Western society into a 
liberal democracy where the individual is deeply respected, and its rights 
and liberties are upheld. As the moral aspects of human agency have been 
of considerable importance in these achievements, it would be somewhat 
naïve to expect that a society in which the homo economicus finds its 
natural habitat will be able to thrive once all its domains are fully econo-
mised through neoliberal governmentality. It is therefore imperative to 
reconstruct the identity of the modern Western individual, which became 
conflated with the notion of the homo economicus. In this paper, this 
reconstruction involves the exploration of the essentially religious and 
moral roots through which the modern individual was invented. The 
invention of the individual and the modern West is often attributed to 
the victory of reason over religion, of the Enlightenment over Christianity. 
This historical narrative, however, is in dire need of being revisited, since 
the individual was not invented through the Enlightenment battle with 
Christianity, but more so through the morality of the Christian tradition, 
which emphasised the unconditional value of the individual, the common 
good and, crucially, self-improvement. The reconstruction of the mod-
ern Western individual therefore involves the exploration of the essentially 
religious roots of (secular) liberalism and the modern individual that is 
constituted through the moral responsibility of each individual as pro-
claimed by St. Paul. The contemporary relevance and necessity of a moral 
outlook on human thought and action can be found in the writings of 
J. S. Mill and Charles Taylor, who both stress the need for an orientation 
towards the good. 
The historical narrative of liberalism and its Christian moral roots, as 
described in this paper, could help to understand the increasingly econo-
mised society we live in today, and therefore create an historical awareness 
that might spark a debate about working towards overcoming the discon-
tents that are paired with neoliberalism. The main objective of this paper, 
therefore, is to regain understanding of the essentially Christian roots of 
the modern individual in order to grasp the discontents and limitations of 
the neoliberal homo economicus. Ultimately, however, the intent of this 
paper is not to end the debate but to foster a more fruitful discussion about 
the way in which liberalism could be reinvented to help create and sustain 
an ethical society.
In order to understand the anthropology of the homo economicus, 
the constitution of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality in the 
context of neoliberalism will first be described and analysed. Secondly, the 
narrative of the Christian roots of liberalism, as distinct from the Enlight-
enment narrative that emphasises ancient Greek roots, will be explained, 
as well as the moral developments that those Christian roots instigated. 
Thirdly, the relations between liberalism, Christianity, and secularism will 
be identified to deepen understanding of secularism as a sphere of morality, 
individual conscience, and free action. Lastly, a discussion will follow in 
which the discontents of neoliberalism will be discussed in relation to the 
religious roots of liberalism, in order to work towards a normative under-
standing of the problem at hand.
2. Neoliberal governmentality and the homo economicus
With the introduction of neoliberalism, a new set of politico-economic 
practices was instigated, one that proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by a focus on individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills “within an institutional framework characterised by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey, 2007, p. 2). There-
fore, similar to the classical liberal tradition, individual freedom is a key 
tenet of neoliberalism. This might, however, be one of the few parallels 
between liberalism and neoliberalism, since the latter mostly focuses on 
freedom in entrepreneurial terms. Nevertheless, in contemporary society 
the neoliberal paradigm has a profound influence, since it causes economic 
values to become increasingly embedded in all aspects of life. Therefore, 
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neoliberalisation has expressed itself in the economisation of everything, 
including heretofore non-economic domains (ibid., p. 33). Consequently, 
what becomes central to society is neoliberal economic rationality, which 
endorses the view that human as well as institutional action is rational 
entrepreneurial action “conducted according to a calculus of utility, 
benefit, or satisfaction against a microeconomic grid of scarcity, supply 
and demand, and moral value-neutrality” (Brown, 2005, p. 40). In short, 
therefore, neoliberalism has become hegemonic as a mode of discourse 
(Harvey, 2007, p. 3). 
Hegemony, a term developed by Gramsci (1978), refers to a specific 
interplay between coercion at the level of the state and consensus at the 
level of civil society, which constitutes a dominant worldview as well as a 
certain power balance in society. This hegemony, however, is not imposed 
aprioristically, but develops through complex relations between the social, 
the economic, and the political. In the neoliberal context, this hegemonic 
mode of discourse refers to the fact that neoliberalisation has pervasive 
effects on the way individuals think and communicate, since neoliberal 
thought has become incorporated into the way many individuals under-
stand the world. Most accounts of the discontents with neoliberalism, 
therefore, address the hegemony that it installed. Neoliberal hegemony 
causes an erosion of opposing political, moral, or subjective claims that 
are located outside the realm of neoliberal rationality, yet inside liberal 
democratic society. Consequently, institutions, venues, and values that 
are organised by non-market rationalities are eroded (Brown, 2015). Of 
course, exceptions are to be found and the hegemony might not have been 
fully established, but what critics address is the increasingly widespread 
dominance of this neoliberal rationality, due to a constant pressure on 
individuals, caused by the neoliberal hegemony, to understand the world 
around them through the neoliberal paradigm. 
2.1  Governmentality and the neoliberal subject
A useful concept in furthering the understanding of the political dimen-
sion of neoliberalisation is governmentality, a concept that Foucault 
defines as an apparatus of administrative power “that has the population 
as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and appa-
ratuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (2007, p. 108). 
Governmentality is a technique of governing mentalities in such a way that 
they become internalised in the subjects. In the case of neoliberal govern-
mentality, these mentalities include norms related to political economy, 
that is, the economy at the level of the entire state. The apparatuses of secu-
rity that Foucault describes are directed at gaining security and a feeling of 
well-being for people in order to manage the population. Consequently, 
the most effective way for neoliberal values and principles to be actively 
instituted, maintained, and reinserted at all levels of society is through 
neoliberal governmentality, which educates desires and configures habits, 
aspirations, and beliefs with market-based values such as ‘investment’ and 
‘competition’ as its operative terms (Li, 2007, p. 275; Read, 2009, p. 29). 
Thus, through neoliberal governmentality social life is regulated from its 
interior, which is the most effective way in which power can achieve an 
effective command over a whole population (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 24). 
Foucault interprets the neoliberal ideal to be the new regime of truth; 
it is a manner, or mentality, in which people are governed and govern 
themselves. Therefore, governmentality should not be interpreted as an 
evil, top-down implementation of a conspiracy by a supposed neoliberal 
class. On the contrary, producer and product are both neoliberal sub-
jects, which means that humans produce, and humans are produced at 
the same time (ibid., p. 136). In other words, neoliberal economisation 
does not only manifest itself through coercion at the level of the state, but 
often even more so through consent at the level of civil society. Neoliberal 
governmentality, therefore, brings together the government of others (sub-
jectification) and the government of one’s self (subjectivation) (Hamann, 
2009). As Foucault described, whereas in the disciplinary society the rela-
tionship between the individual and power was a top-down, static one, 
the relationship in a control society is open, and it extends throughout 
the depths of the consciousness and bodies of individuals, meaning that 
with this governmentality, freedom of the individual and regulation of the 
population are subtly intertwined (Deleuze, 1992; Hardt & Negri, 2000, 
p. 24). Thus, neoliberal governmentality is the strategic production of the 
social conditions conducive to the constitution of the homo economicus, 
a specific form of neoliberal subjectivity.
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2.2 The homo economicus
As was mentioned in the previous paragraph, the subject that is produced 
by the neoliberal governmentality can be called the homo economicus; an 
archetypal species created after a specific image of the economy (Brown, 
2015, p. 10). This entails that the homo economicus is a free and autono-
mous ‘atom’ of self-interest, fully responsible for navigating life in society 
using rational choice and cost-benefit calculation. This atomistic outlook 
on human agency endorses the view that the homo economicus is a self-
reliant and self-interested agent, responsible for realising its own objectives 
in a rational, calculative, and competitive manner. Within the neoliberal 
paradigm, social existence, that is, interaction or association between these 
atoms of self-interest, can therefore only be viable when understood as a 
contract based on personal utility rather than a manifestation of communi-
tarian ideals. Thus, in the neoliberal paradigm every attempt of this homo 
economicus to realise its ends—from building relationships, to education, 
to spending time with friends—can be interpreted economically, according 
to a specific calculation of costs and benefits (Read, 2009, p. 28). 
Consequently, the concept of the worker has been eradicated; it has 
been converted into human capital (Foucault, 2008, p. 226). In contempo-
rary society, the individual is mostly regarded as a small enterprise (human 
capital) that has to identify its skills, put them on the market, differentiate 
them from the skills of others in light of competition, and propose these 
talents for a certain price. Just as the concept of the worker was eradi-
cated, wages become the revenue that is earned on an initial investment, 
such as getting an education, which is an investment in one’s skills and 
abilities. Furthermore, any activity that increases expected revenue, like 
moving abroad, taking an extra course, creating a resume, or participa-
ting in ‘networking events’, is a further investment in this human capital. 
As this account of the homo economicus demonstrates, governmentality 
is indeed a very effective means to impose market values in such a way 
that they become an integral aspect of both understanding and action, 
and even of being. Finally, the notion that might best describe the homo 
economicus, taking all its features as described above into account, is the 
‘entrepreneur of himself ’ (ibid.). For Foucault, the homo economicus is an 
entrepreneur of himself in the sense of “being for himself his own capital, 
being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] 
earnings” (ibid., p. 226).
2.3 Liberalism and neoliberalism
The societal consequence of neoliberal governmentality and the subse-
quent creation of the homo economicus is that exploitation, domination, 
and inequality are rendered invisible as socio-political phenomena to the 
extent that the social condition of each individual is simply regarded as 
the effect of his or her own choices and investments, given that the homo 
economicus is perceived of as a rational, calculating, and self-reliant entre-
preneur of the self (Brown, 2005, p. 43; Read, 2009, p. 43). One might 
object to this, however, that this has been the case with liberalism long 
before the dawn of neoliberalism as well, but Brown (2015, p. 33) provides 
us with three ways in which the contemporary economisation of subjects 
by neoliberal governmentality is distinct from liberal thought.
Firstly, in contrast with for example classical liberalism, “we are everywhere 
homo oeconomicus and only homo oeconomicus” (ibid.). Classical lib-
erals were well aware of the distinction between politics and economics, 
and many of them were wary of economic values having an excessive 
influence on politics, morality, and ethical life (Sedlacek, 2013, p. 255). 
Secondly, homo economicus is perceived of as human capital seeking to 
strengthen its competitive position, rather than as an agent of exchange or 
interest. The neoliberal homo economicus, then, is rather different from 
the classical liberal individual that has a “propensity to truck, barter, and 
exchange one thing for another” (Smith, 1776/1999, p. 117). As Foucault 
(2003, p. 194) explains, classical liberalism holds exchange at the centre 
of society, since not only relations in the marketplace but also certain 
freedoms, rights, and liberties can be interpreted in terms of exchange. 
With neoliberalism, however, the focus on exchange is replaced by a focus 
on competition. While exchange was considered to be natural, competi-
tion is understood by neoliberals to be an artificial relation that must be 
protected from monopoly and state intervention, and therefore a constant 
re-establishment of neoliberal values is needed. Consequently, this sub-
jectification of individuals as competitive creatures, through neoliberal 
governmentality, actively constitutes and reinforces the anthropology of 
the homo economicus. Lastly, the homo economicus, as human capital, 
10
Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy Mathieu van Kooten | Reinventing Liberalism
is extremely concerned with self-investment and self-marketing through 
likes, followers, and retweets, but also through consumption, leisure, and 
education, which are all strategic decisions aimed at enhancing its portfolio 
value in all domains of life (Feher, 2009, p. 30). As Mirowski (2013, p. 92) 
argues, social networking sites like Facebook are neoliberal technologies 
par excellence since they actively nudge individuals to embrace and invest 
in their entrepreneurial selves. This strikingly points at the subtleness of 
neoliberal governmentality that does not only actively constitute the homo 
economicus through particular policies, but more so through the very 
mundane practices and technologies that surround us in everyday life.1 
Thus, whereas liberalism portrays the economic man as a man of 
exchange, neoliberal governmentality sets out to ensure that individu-
als “assume market-based values in all of their judgments and practices 
in order to accumulate sufficient qualities of human capital” (Hamann, 
2009, p. 38). Ultimately, through this process the subject of the homo 
economicus is constituted; a ‘free’ and autonomous atom of self-interest.
3. Liberalism: child of modernity?
As was mentioned in the introduction, in order to gain deeper understand-
ing of the discontents with neoliberalism, it is imperative to assess the roots 
of liberalism itself. Wall (2015, p. 4) states that while there might be some 
anticipations of liberal ideas in ancient and medieval thought, “liberalism is 
widely, and correctly, viewed as a modern development”. Among many oth-
ers, Wall puts forward the thesis that Enlightenment thinkers, in contrast 
with those in the preceding dark ages, believed in human freedom and 
progress, and therefore broke with traditional and hierarchical beliefs and 
institutions—especially the church—that supposedly had always prevented 
a march towards human freedom. This thesis ultimately denies, or at least 
heavily relativises, the role of religion and the Judaeo-Christian heritage in 
shaping the modern West as we know it. Already during the Enlightenment 
this view was held, and institutions like the church were frequently attacked 
with strong words, such as Voltaire’s famous “écraser l’infâme”, which trans-
lates to “crush the infamous one” (1763/2000, p. xv). Furthermore, it is 
widely argued that the modern secular movement, which was interrupted 
by the age of faith in the Middle Ages, is part of a continuum which reaches 
back to the ancient past. Thus, at the core of this thesis we can find the 
assumption that the modern West as we know it is a child of modernity, 
and thereby, through the Enlightenment, a grandchild of ancient Greece. 
That this narrative is widely held is perhaps best illustrated by the first draft 
of the European constitution in which “Europe’s debt to ancient Greece and 
Rome was solemnly acknowledged. So, too, were the achievements of the 
Enlightenment. About the Christian roots of European civilisation, however, 
there was nothing” (Holland, 2008). 
A few contemporary thinkers, however, have questioned the legitimacy of the 
claim that liberalism is a child of modernity, by showing that the liberal con-
ception of the free individual did not originate in ancient Greece, but rather 
gradually developed during the time of early Christianity and the Middle Ages, 
in which religion played an essential role (Siedentop, 2014, p. 349; Zakaria, 
2003, p. 32; Holland, 2008). As Zakaria (2003, p. 31) mentions, the obses-
sion with ancient Greece from the Renaissance onwards is partly based on 
fantasy. Ancient Greece was indeed an extraordinary culture in which science, 
philosophy, music, and other arts gloriously developed. However, the per-
spective that the ancient Greeks had of the self and its relation to society was 
fundamentally different. In the following paragraphs, the ancient Greek indi-
vidual will be contrasted with the Christian notion of the individual to show 
that the modern individual was not invented through the Enlightenment 
battle with Christianity, but more so through the morality of the Christian 
tradition that started with St. Paul and culminated in the rise of liberalism.
3.1 Natural inequality in the ancient world
As Siedentop (2014, p. 18) explains, the world of antiquity was divided in 
a public and a domestic sphere, the latter not being a sphere of individuals, 
but rather a sphere of the family. This family, however, was not conceived 
of as an association of related individuals, but rather as a small, indepen-
dent church. The natural inequality of roles was fundamental to the Greek 
family and society, since the pater familias, the head of the family, was both 
the magistrate as well as its high priest of this church called the family 
(ibid., p. 9). The pater familias had absolute authority, and was seen as 
the keeper of the sacred fire and the preserver of the family cult. As Fustel 
de Coulanges (1864/2001, p. 40) wrote in his book The Ancient City, the 
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ancient family was both the focus and the medium of religious belief, and 
ultimately an instrument of immortality. Thus, something more powerful 
than birth, affection, or physical strength united the ancient family, it was 
“the religion of the sacred fire, and of dead ancestors” (ibid., p. 31).
The centrality of the religious family also had its impact on the gra-dually 
developing larger associations, like the gens, phratries, and, finally, the polis 
(ibid., p. 98).2  The Roman and Greek institutions that emerged were simi-
larly shaped by beliefs about sacred ancestors, most clearly indicated by the 
development of the idea of property rights. Property did not belong to an 
individual, it belonged to the family, and its importance resided in the fact that 
family property was integral to the family religion and worship. The Greeks 
and Romans understood society as an association of families, rather than as 
an association of individuals. Furthermore, family slaves, strangers, and aliens 
in both ancient Greece and Rome could not own property, since the holy soil 
of the city could not simply be appropriated from the ancestors and ‘blasphe-
mously’ be given to strangers (Gorman, 1992, p. 7). Besides property rights, 
the freedom to rule was also unequally distributed in society and reserved to 
a relatively small aristocracy: “what effectively distinguishes the citizen proper 
from all others is his participation in giving judgement and in holding office” 
(Aristotle, trans. 1992, p. 169). All others, including slaves, women, work-
ers, and foreigners, were not regarded as citizens since they were considered 
incompetent of giving judgement and holding office (Isin, 2002, p. 30).
Thus, society was seen as an association of families, and later larger asso-
ciations, and anyone who did not find a place in this hierarchical scheme of 
relations was regarded as an outcast. In other words, natural inequality was 
the mode. In the aristocratic society of ancient Greece, different levels of social 
status reflected inherent differences of being (inherent inequality of nature), 
which meant that logos (reason) was virtually inseparable from the hierarchi-
cal ordering of things (Siedentop, 2014, p. 52). Therefore, Siedentop (ibid., 
p. 15) states that the 18th century Enlightenment thinkers failed to notice 
that the ancient family, based on the belief in natural inequality, began as a 
veritable church, which constrained its members to an extent that can scarcely 
be exaggerated. The individual as we know it had not been invented yet, and 
therefore we cannot speak of the ancient individual as one that is free in a 
modern liberal sense. 
3.2 St. Paul and individual moral agency
The aforementioned aristocratic model began to crumble around the first 
century B.C., when the relentless spread of centralised Roman power 
undermined the widely held views about citizenship and (in)equality. This 
went hand in hand with new philosophical developments, especially in the 
Platonic tradition, that headed in a more mystical direction (Siedentop, 
2014, p. 53). Consequently, ethical thought was gradually reshaped and 
moral rules were less and less considered as rational conclusions derived 
from the nature of things, as was the case in the aristocratic model of natu-
ral inequality, but rather as commands from the Absolute. As Siedentop 
notes, the image of the Absolute, a single God who imposes his laws on 
his people, strikingly paralleled “the experience of peoples who were being 
subjugated to the Roman imperium” (ibid.). Spurred by these develop-
ments in the first century of the Common Era, a new kind of liberty, and 
subsequently a novel perception of the self, came to the fore; one that 
contrasted with the ‘old’ type of liberty that was prevalent in ancient Greek 
society.
A new figure emerged on stage, named Jesus of Nazareth, who 
preached that he was the son of God and that those individuals who would 
repent of their sins could enter the kingdom of heaven. For the first time 
in history, the individual replaced the family as the focus of immortality 
(ibid., p. 58). The teachings of Jesus were revolutionary in the sense that 
they provided a new way of looking at the world: through individual moral 
agency. The earliest surviving writings about Jesus and his teachings can 
be found in the work of St. Paul, for whom faith in Jesus Christ is an act 
through which human agency can become the medium for God’s love. All 
individuals are invited to embrace this new rationality and change their 
mindset: “repent, and believe in the good news” (Mark 1:15).3   
Paul thus overturns the theretofore widely held view of natural inequality 
by creating an inner connection between divine will and human agency. 
The leap of faith of changing one’s mind through becoming one with 
God through Christ is an invitation to seek a deeper self. This act of faith 
consists in an inner crucifixion (i.e. leaving the sinful nature behind), 
exemplified by the crucifixion of Jesus himself. Through this ‘Christo-
morphosis’, human beings experience moral renewal since they are invited 
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to respond by becoming virtuous and thus share in the divine nature, to 
become like God himself (van Kooten, 2014, p. 403). Therefore, individu-
als can, through this personal transaction based on love, be transformed in 
another, better self: human identity is reconstructed. Because all humans are 
inherently equal through their personal relation to God, the most impor-
tant law in Christianity has always been: “You shall love your neighbour as 
yourself ” (Galatians 5:14). This message thus provides a novel ontological 
foundation for the individual. As van Kooten (2014, p. 403) explains, 
Paul’s essentially original and coherent anthropology contains a strong 
sense of solidarity and unity of human beings and God, and this human-
divine correspondence presupposes and results in moral like-mindedness. 
This new anthropology provides human beings with an opening for moral 
improvement, through the encounter with God’s moral excellence.
3.3 The impact of the pauline anthropology
What are the social, cultural, and political consequences of the writings of 
Paul, which Siedentop (2014, p. 58) describes as a moral earthquake? The 
implication of Paul’s message is that the individual is more than whatever 
social position or affiliation he happens to occupy. In other words, a gap 
opens between individuals and their role in society (ibid., p. 62). As Paul 
states: “There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, 
there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus” 
(Galatians 3:28). The crucial point to of this bible verse, that is directed 
not only to Jews but to everyone, is that the relation with the Absolute, 
the source of all being, constitutes a primary identity that is not based on 
social standing, as was the case in the ancient Greek society where natural 
inequality was the mode, but on individual moral agency. All other social 
roles, whether father, daughter, official, or slave, become secondary to this 
primary role. 
As Neutel (2013) notes, this message of Paul is a utopian and cos-
mopolitan ideal of community, it is an exercise in imagining alternatives 
to society as it is. Ethnic, gender, sexual, economic, or social differences 
are not relevant anymore; every human being is created after God’s image 
(Genesis 1:27), and therefore equal. Consequently, all existing social rela-
tions are open to scrutiny, and Siedentop sees this principle developing in 
European history, undermining the moral foundations first of slavery and 
then of serfdom. It should be emphasised that this was not a linear process 
that started with Christianity and completed with contemporary notions 
of equality: the process was slow, painful, and incomplete. Nevertheless, 
Christianity, starting with St. Paul, endowed the West with "a kind of 
constitution, a sense of the limits of the legitimate use of public power, 
[and] limits established by moral rights” (Siedentop, 2001, pp. 196-7). 
Thus, the rise of the Christian Church is the first important source of 
individual liberty in the West, and our modern understanding of human 
agency, and therefore of individual liberty, has its roots in the moral intui-
tions of Christianity (Zakaria, 2003, p. 31).
4. Liberalism, christianity, and secularism
The modern understanding of the individual can thus be traced back 
to the beginning of Christianity, with St. Paul’s message of the morally 
responsible individual at its core. As the writings of multiple classical liber-
als demonstrate, liberalism can be seen as a political culmination of this 
emphasis on moral agency, since 19th century liberalism was optimistic 
and imbued with strongly held moral convictions (Fawcett, 2014, p. 74). 
One of the writers that signifies this connection between liberalism and its 
moral roots is John Stuart Mill, who describes the importance of religion 
in addressing the good life. Furthermore, in this section the connection 
between secularism and Christianity, as well as the contemporary relevance 
of morality as explained by Charles Taylor, will be highlighted, in order 
to arrive at a deeper understanding of the connection between liberalism, 
Christianity, and secularism. 
4.1 Mill and the summum bonum
The writings of John Stuart Mill on religion are an often-neglected topic 
in secondary literature, mostly because they challenge the long-standing 
view that liberalism and conceptions of the best life, the summum bonum, 
are inherently opposed (Devigne, 2006, p. 15). Mill argues that “with the 
decline of polytheism came Greek philosophy; with the decline of Catholi-
cism, the modern [philosophy]” (Mill, 1985a, p. 577). In other words, 
when religions are incapable of explaining the meaning of life to ordinary 
humans, a vacuum develops which causes new philosophical and scien-
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tific explanations to come forward. This vacuum was also present in the 
18th century, the time of the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment, when com-
promise had to be made: Christianity became less legitimate with the 
declining authority of the church, and the individual became liberated 
from bondage to superstition and ecclesiastical authority (Devigne, 2006, 
p. 17). Even though Mill praises this liberation of the individual from 
ecclesiastical authority, he argues that this religious compromise with the 
Enlightenment also created unforeseen costs, since the new paradigm that 
was set into place did not teach anything else than an enlightened rational 
obedience to liberal rules of justice, overlooking the need to address the 
need of an idea of the good life.
As Mill (1985b, p. 421) argues in Utility of Religion, religion, like art, 
should establish something more than merely the devotion to practical 
aims, it should create a strong image of what human perfection is, and how 
it can be attained. Mill explains that this essential feature of Christianity 
has been lost in modern times, through the aforementioned compromise 
with enlightenment thought. Consequently, most English liberals tend to 
ignore the fact that the modern justice system only compels general obedi-
ence to the law, and cannot substitute morality in general in formulating 
the good life. Thus, if liberalism is to generate a comprehensive morality 
for the future, according to Mill, Christianity will have to develop dia-
lectically so that it creates a culture, adapted to civil society, that makes 
human flourishing possible: the sublation of thesis and antithesis “into the 
synthesis of a comprehensive morality of the future, is the liberal philoso-
phers’ highest goal” (Devigne, 2006, p. 25). 
4.2 Christianity and secular liberalism
One might discard a call to morality and acknowledgement of Christian 
roots based on its seeming opposition to the secular state. The roots of this 
seeming opposition may be found in the tendency of contemporary society 
to promote a hostile secularism, which teaches that religion is irrational 
and potentially dangerous, and it should therefore be quarantined in the 
private sphere (Ahdar, 2013, p. 418). But, even though secular liberalism is 
often presented as such, it is far from an objective, neutral, and value-free 
paradigm (ibid., p. 404). Rather, secular liberalism emphasises the impor-
tance of the conditions in which (religious) beliefs can be equally and freely 
formed and defended. More specifically, at the core of secularism we can 
find a belief in underlying moral equality of humans, which in turn implies 
that there is a sphere in which each should be entirely free to make his or 
her own decisions, especially regarding such fundamental aspects of life as 
religion. Therefore, Christianity itself, especially through its emphasis on 
the (moral) equality of humans, played an important role in shaping the 
discourse that gave rise to modern liberalism and secularism (Siedentop, 
2014, p. 359). Siedentop even goes as far as saying that “secularism is 
Christianity’s greatest gift to the world” (ibid., p. 360). 
However, by promoting the view that secularism is synonymous to 
non-belief, indifference, and materialism, a great deal of the narrative of 
the roots of liberalism, as well as the connection with the moral intuitions 
that shaped Western thought, is lost. As Murray (2016, p. 262) argues, how 
can one expect that the notion of individuals as free and equal beings “is 
sustainable without reference to the belief that gave birth to it? Just because 
you are part of a tradition does not mean you will believe what those who 
originated that tradition believed even if you like and admire its results”. 
Secularism, properly understood, is fundamentally based on the moral 
equality of humans as inspired by the Christian tradition, which implies that 
it creates a sphere in which each individual should be able and free to make 
his or her own decisions, a sphere of individual conscience and free action, 
and ultimately a sphere that is concerned with moral questions (Siedentop, 
2014, p. 361). Therefore, if secularism is portrayed as inherently opposed to 
religion, instead of the outcome of the moral intuitions that shaped western 
thought, we are telling ourselves a very one-sided narrative. Even worse, we 
also undermine the moral intuitions that have been central to the narrative 
of liberalism.
4.3 Modern identity and morality
A thinker that might help to contextualise these thoughts and translate them 
to contemporary society is Charles Taylor, who describes the development 
of our modern understanding of what it means to be an individual (1989, p. 
393). The current modern identity that developed out of several important 
historical transformations, including neoliberalism, has a problem regarding 
the search for meaning (ibid., p. 17). In contemporary Western society, God 
is dead for many and the existential predicament of fear for ‘meaninglessness’ 
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might be what defines our times (ibid., p. 18). This fear of meaninglessness 
out of the existential predicament is linked to the contemporary under-
standing of the self as a neutral and clean slate, as an individual that is not in 
need of any conception of the good life in order to make sense of life.
This view of the self, in turn, is linked to what Taylor describes as 
the ‘projective view’ of morality. This projective view is the Enlighten-
ment-inspired assertion that qualities and values are epiphenomenal 
subjective illusions that we impose upon a value-neutral, mechanistic 
universe (Frisina, 2002, p. 16). The objection that Taylor has towards 
this supposedly ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ view of human agency is that for 
human agents to make sense of our lives and the world around us they 
need an orientation to the summum bonum, a qualitative discrimination of 
the incomparably higher (Taylor, 1989, p. 47). To know who you are, is to 
be oriented in moral space, a space of meaningfulness, a space of what is 
good or bad. Consequently, a view of the self from a perspective stripped 
of this moral side cuts out a central part of our humanity, which is valuing 
the capacity to decide, in a meaningful dialogue with others, what truly 
matters to us, what makes life worthy and meaningful. 
5. Discussion: a comprehensive morality for the future
In order to arrive at a normative analysis of neoliberalism, its roots and its 
potential future, let us recapitulate what has been established throughout 
the previous sections. The neoliberal paradigm became hegemonic in the 
sense that it deployed a governmentality that caused (and still causes) a 
widespread economisation of heretofore noneconomic domains, activities, 
and subjects. Consequently, the neoliberal subject was created: the homo 
economicus. This subject, also described by the notion ‘entrepreneur of 
the self ’, is a fully rational, self-interested, and economised agent that is 
mainly concerned with self-investment and self-promotion to advance his 
or her competitive position in society. As many individuals will recognise, 
in contemporary society social networking sites are neoliberal technologies 
par excellence, illustrating the refined and subtle governmental techniques 
that make individuals embrace their entrepreneurial selves. This neoliberal 
paradigm that proposes that man is a free and autonomous atom of self-
interest, however, overshadows the moral aspects of the individual since 
it mostly teaches rational obedience to the neoliberal ‘rules of the game’. 
Since the neoliberal hegemony primarily ‘forces’ individuals to be free as 
a homo economicus, anything else related to the summum bonum is ren-
dered irrelevant in the large scheme of competition and entrepreneurial 
action.
Thus, it seems that neoliberalism, as a resurgence of liberalism, has 
lost the 19th century morally-imbued optimism that liberals like Mill pro-
moted. The writings of Mill, especially his On Liberty, therefore, are of 
great contemporary relevance. Mill already described the moral vacuum 
that came about through the religious compromise with Enlightenment 
thought, which did not teach anything else than an enlightened rational 
obedience to liberal rules of justice. Similarly, then, it can be argued that 
this compromise on the side of religion, or morality in general, has been 
taken even further with the rise of neoliberalism, which established a 
governmentalised hegemony of neoliberal rationality and, consequently, 
constituted the contemporary anthropology of the homo economicus. 
Thus, it can be argued that a new moral vacuum has been installed, since 
the homo economicus, as was argued in this paper, is becoming increas-
ingly concerned with self-investment, self-marketing, and competition. 
As Geuss notes, we cannot expect to rid ourselves completely of our dis-
content with neoliberalism, but this thought itself is an assertion of the 
“strand [of liberalism] that is action-oriented but reflexively anti-utopian 
and asserts that no system either of action or thought is perfect” (2002, 
p. 336). Thus, the discontents with neoliberalism that have been described 
in this paper, most importantly the moral vacuum of the homo economi-
cus, might therefore not necessarily be objections, but rather signs of the 
continuing vitality of the liberal tradition.
A new moral vacuum thus came about because neoliberal governmen-
tality set out to ensure that individuals assume neoliberal, market-based 
values in all their judgments and practices in order to enhance their human 
capital. The robust moral convictions of the past and the concern for the 
summum bonum have been overshadowed in contemporary society, and 
as Taylor writes, this contributes to an existential predicament of fear for 
meaninglessness. As he adds, individuals need a moral orientation to the 
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good in order to make sense of life and attach worth and meaning to it, 
they need a moral orientation to the good in order to be human. Therefore, 
if the neoliberal hegemony and its anthropology keep governing human 
understanding and action, imperative aspects of humanity such as mea-
ning, identity, and morality are becoming increasingly overshadowed by 
the rational obedience to the market-based, neoliberal rationality. One 
might object, however, that neoliberalism is an evolved kind of liberalism 
that similarly takes freedom as its core, with its own ethics that are more 
suited to the demands of the 21st century. Even though this claim is not 
completely invalid, one should still be critical and wonder whether free-
dom centred around entrepreneurial terms is the rich kind of freedom that 
allowed for the institutions and practices that gave rise to the liberal state 
and will be able to shape our future directed by identity and purpose. As 
Dilts strikingly states: “What are the ethics of a regime of knowing the self 
that treats oneself never as an end in itself, but always as a means toward an 
end, as a machine for the production of an income?” (2011, p. 145). Thus, 
the homo economicus, increasingly assuming market-based values in all of 
its judgments and practices, will have trouble to establish, in a meaningful 
dialogue with others, what truly matters, for the individual as well as for 
the greater good. The existential predicament of fear for ‘meaninglessness’ 
that Taylor describes can therefore only be addressed if the homo eco-
nomicus becomes balanced with the moral roots of the individual, with 
an orientation towards the good that is not solely concerned with, and 
directed by, economic intentions and outcomes.
Why, then, is it imperative to stress the narrative of the Christian roots 
of liberalism and the West? As the narrative of liberalism in this paper 
describes, the roots of liberalism, and consequently the roots of our society, 
can be found in the invention of the individual out of an individual moral 
responsibility proclaimed by St. Paul, who overturned the rigid and wide-
spread view of natural inequality by creating an inner relation between 
divine will and human agency. Consequently, there is a moral equality on 
which the primary identity of all humans is based. This narrative shows, in 
contrast with the narrative of liberalism as merely being a child of modern-
ity, that the individual was not just invented through the battle between 
Enlightenment and religion, but through the morality of the Christian 
tradition which emphasised the unconditional value of the individual, the 
common good and, crucially, self-improvement. The Enlightenment was 
indeed a break from what had gone before, but it cannot count as a total 
rupture. As Holland (2008) states: “Just as the philosophes and their heirs 
could not help but draw on the ethical capital of faith they so insistently 
rejected, so, too, were the parameters of the evolving liberal state shaped by 
presumptions that were ultimately centuries old”. Therefore, Christianity, 
through the freedom of conscience and the morally responsible indivi-
dual, can be seen as the first important source of individual liberty in the 
West, as well as an undeniably integral part of the narrative and identity of 
Western history. The fact that this narrative is not generally acknowledged 
contributes to the fact that we have lost touch with the moral traditions 
that greatly shaped the course of Western history, creating the conditions 
for the homo economicus to exist. 
It is imperative to stress that the development of this essential fea-
ture of Christianity was slow, painful, and incomplete. This paper is not 
an attempt to deny the profound impact that the Enlightenment had on 
the modern West, especially regarding the liberation of individuals from 
ecclesiastical authority and moral decadence. However, as Mill argued, the 
compromise on the side of religion in its broadest sense was, and is, too 
big, which in the end allowed for the hegemonic creation of the increa-
singly morally void habitat of the homo economicus. This secular habitat, 
however, should not be conceived of as an amoral one, since it is a sphere 
in which each individual should be able and free to make his or her own 
decisions, a sphere of individual conscience and free action. Keeping this 
in mind, a way opens up to start a serious and meaningful dialogue about 
the way in which liberalism can help create and sustain a comprehensive 
morality and ethical society in the future.
In order to work towards overcoming the discontents, there is a need 
for a reinvention of liberalism focused on formulating a comprehensive 
morality for the future and creating the conditions in which this compre-
hensive morality can develop itself. If neoliberal hegemony and the homo 
economicus remain at the centre of human understanding and action, the 
erosion of the institutions, values, and morality organised by non-market 
rationalities will persevere. The democratic values and institutions as we 
know them are increasingly becoming overshadowed by a cost-benefit and 
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efficiency rationale, weakening the strong moral foundations that they are 
built on. Therefore, a reinvention of liberalism is necessary. Not a reinven-
tion in the sense of a reinstatement of the Christian religion or a reversal of 
neoliberalisation, but a historical and cultural reinvention with on the one 
hand the acknowledgement and understanding of the religious and moral 
intuitions that shaped Western history, and on the other hand a future per-
spective that takes into account the necessity of an orientation towards the 
good. In this way, the connection with the moral traditions beneath the 
surface of Western culture will be regained, opening up a new perspective 
for formulating a comprehensive morality for the future. The result of this 
reinvention, therefore, would be an understanding of history and human 
agency that will endow the West and its peoples with a stronger sense of 
identity and purpose. 
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Notes
1. In hegemonic terms particular policies are based on coercion, whereas mundane practi-
ces and technologies point at consent.
2. Whereas the gens was a family of individuals with descent from a common ancestor, 
the phratries, a larger form of association, refers to the social division within Greek tribes. 
Lastly, the polis, an even larger form of association, refers to the cities in ancient Greece.
3. To repent in Greek is μετανοια, which translates as changing one’s mind or purpose 
(Boda & Smith, 2006, p. 90).
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